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Abstract
We examine the determinants of issuance of yen-denominated international bonds over the
period from 1990 through 2010. This period was marked by low Japanese interest rates that
led some investors to pursue \carry trades," which consisted of funding investments in higher
interest rate currencies with low interest rate, yen-denominated obligations. In principle, bond
issuers that have 
exibility in their funding currency could also conduct a carry-trade strategy by
funding in yen during this low interest rate period. We examine the characteristics of rms who
appeared to have adopted this strategy using a data set containing almost 80,000 international
bond issues. Our results suggest that there was a movement towards issuing in yen in the
international bond markets starting in 2003, but this appears to have ended with the outbreak
of the global nancial crisis in 2007. Furthermore, the breakdown of carry-trade conditions in
2007 corresponds to a resurgence in the ability of economic fundamentals, such as the volume
of trade with Japan, to explain the decision to issue international bonds denominated in yen.
JEL classication: F31, G15
Keywords: Carry trade, bond issuance
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The early-to-mid portion of the previous decade was marked by the combination of low levels of
exchange rate volatility and low interest rate policies in a number of countries. This combination
encouraged investors to adopt currency \carry trade positions", whereby investments in high in-
terest rate yielding currencies were nanced through debt obligations denominated in low interest
rate currencies.1 In particular, the poor performance of the Japanese economy during this period,
combined with its low in
ation and even de
ationary price movements, aorded investors an at-
tractive opportunity to fund investments in high interest-yielding currencies with yen-denominated
debt obligations. Galati, Heath, and McGuire (2007) claim that the yen and the Swiss franc were
the most commonly cited funding currencies for carry trades in 2007.2
While standard uncovered interest rate parity theory suggests that carry trades should not
be protable, as interest rate dierentials should be compensated ex post by appreciation in the
funding currency, numerous studies studies have found that carry-trade positions can be protable
ex post; for example, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007) and Darvas (2009). In the specic
case of yen-funded carry trades, some empirical studies, such as Gyntelberg and Remonola (2007)
and Fong (2010), report that yen carry-trade transactions generated higher risk-adjusted returns
than several other international investment opportunities. Still, it is commonly understood that
carry-trade positions can be exposed to dramatic \crashes," as prots earned over long periods
of exposure can be quickly lost, as discussed by Brunnermeier, Pedersen, and Nagel (2008). As a
result, most studies of carry-trade activity indicate that it is most prevalent during tranquil times
and quickly abandoned as volatility increases.3
Despite the apparent risk, carry-trade activity appears to have been of substantial scope in
recent years. Galati and Melvin (2004) argue that a surge in currency trading in 2004 appears
to be due in part with increased prot opportunities through carry-trade activity. There is also
1See Galati, Heath, and McGuire (2007) for a more detailed denition and discussion of the carry trade.
2Japanese interest rates were also low during the second part of the 1990s, leading to some yen carry trade activity.
However, the pursuit of carry trade activity in that decade broke down during the ruble crisis of 1998, as hedge funds
unwinded positions in response to increased volatility [e.g. Ito (2002)].
3See Jord a and Taylor (2009) for a detailed analysis of carry-trade strategies and measures of protability.
1an understanding that carry trade activity can depreciate the value of the funding currency and
appreciate the value of the target currency due to the large capital allocations to carry-trade
activity.
In practice, it is dicult to identify carry-trade positions. For example, Galati, Heath, and
McGuire (2007) identify $45 billion in yen-denominated capital 
ows into Caribbean nancial cen-
ters between 2002 and 2007 that appear to be associated with carry-trade activity, but they grant
that these 
ows could alternatively be purchases of securities by special purpose vehicles. They
still argue that turnover patterns in derivatives and foreign exchange markets that they observe in
the data during this period are correlated with conditions that would be associated with protable
carry trade activity.
While the literature has concentrated on carry trades as leveraged positions funded in one
low interest rate currency and placed in another high interest rate currency, in principle, any
investment which is funded in one currency and has a revenue stream associated with another can
be loosely considered to be a form of a \carry trade." In these instances, the investor has chosen
to fund an investment in a currency other than that associated with the investment to be made,
presumably because of anticipated reductions in funding costs associated with denominating debt
in that currency. In this paper, we consider one hybrid form of such carry trade activity, the
decision to issue yen-denominated international bonds.
The currency denomination decision in international bond issuance has been studied in the
context of the advent of the euro by Hale and Spiegel (2008).4 Using bond-level data, they found
that rms responded to the increased scale economies in European bond markets associated with
the advent of the euro by issuing larger shares of euro-denominated debt. Moreover, they found the
responsiveness of rms to be heterogeneous. The impact of the euro was greater on non-nancial
rms and on new issuers relative to issuers already seasoned in bond markets. In the rst case,
the larger response appears to re
ect the fact that non-nancial rms are less adept at hedging
foreign exchange risk than nancial rms and would therefore be more reluctant to issue in the
national currencies of the future euro area. In the latter case, the greater responsiveness by new
4See also the earlier study by Santos and Tsatsaronis (2006).
2issuers appears to re
ect the fact that seasoned issuers may already be locked{in to a given currency
of issue, perhaps due to a relationship with an underwriter of a given nationality. For example,
Lopez and Spiegel (2009b) found that Japanese borrowers in the international yen-denominated
bond market faced lower underwriting costs from Japanese underwriters after issuer characteristics
were taken into account. A similar result was found for non-Japanese borrowers and non-Japanese
underwriters.
In this paper, we concentrate on the impact of carry-trade opportunities on rm currency
denomination decisions with particular emphasis on the yen. In particular, we look for evidence
that the carry trade diminished the strength of economic fundamentals in explaining debt issuance
decisions. We concentrate on trade patterns as economic drivers of foreign-currency funding. Firms
typically have a revenue stream denominated by the home currency of the location of their sales.
For most rms, this would be their home country, but exporting rms may also have a substantial
portion of their revenues associated with the currencies of their export destinations. As such, one
might expect that holding all else equal, rms with greater shares of exports to a given country
would be more likely to issue some of their debt obligations in that nation's currency. Our data
set consists of nearly 80,000 international bond issues of which 16% are denominated in yen, 33%
in U.S. dollars and 17% in euros.
Evidence along these lines has been found for other nancial instruments and other currencies.
Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) found that U.S. rms with greater foreign operations are more likely to
use foreign currency debt to hedge their increased exposure. Similarly, Nandy (2010) found that a
one standard deviation increase in the ratio of a rm's foreign sales in the United States increased
the probability of commercial bank borrowing in U.S. dollars by 23%. In our case, considering
the decision to denominate issuance in international bond markets in yen, we would expect rms
with greater exports to Japan to be more likely to issue in yen, again after conditioning for other
characteristics that might in
uence rm issuance decisions.
Unfortunately, we do not have export data available at the rm level to match our bond-level
data set. Instead, we use the trade patterns of the rm's home country as a proxy for the relative
3intensity of that rm's exports to Japan. For our full sample and for sub-samples of nancial
and nonnancial rms, we nd that increased national trade with Japan is signicantly positively
correlated with the decision of an individual rm to issue in debt denominated in yen, even after
controlling for a variety of rm characteristics that also may in
uence currency denomination deci-
sions. However, the sign on our proxy variable changes when we condition on whether the issuing
rm is headquartered in the United States or Europe. In addition, the coecient estimates on the
national indicators for these issuers are negative and statistically signicant. These results suggest
that the economic relationship between export activities and bond issuance is weaker for these
countries, perhaps due to rms based in these countries having more desirable alternatives in their
home currencies. The negative coecients on the trade proxy variable over our sample period for
yen-denominated bonds issued by rms based in countries other than Japan, the United States and
Europe suggest that carry-trade incentives may have weakened the hypothesized issuance relation-
ships; that is, low Japanese interest rates may have given rms with little or no Japanese export
activity an incentive to fund issues in yen in order to conduct carry-trade related transactions.
To examine this hypothesis, we estimate the impact that the global nancial crisis and the
sudden decline in carry-trade activities has on our empirical analysis. Specically, we date the end
of the carry-trade period as June 2007, when the yen began its most recent period of appreciation
with respect to the U.S. dollar. When we interact our trade proxy variable with the sample period
following the end of the carry-trade period, we get positive and mainly signicant coecients that
suggest a positive relationship between Japanese trade and yen bond issuance is present after carry-
trade distortions are reduced. We conclude from this empirical evidence that the breakdown of
carry-trade opportunities, due in large part to the increased volatility and tighter credit conditions
associated with the outbreak of the global nancial crisis, was associated with a resurgence of the
importance of economic fundamentals in the currency denomination of international bond issues.
We also nd that this eect appears to be more important for nancial rms, suggesting
that nancial rms were more active in carry-trade activities and thus had their debt currency
denomination decisions more aected by the carry trade opportunities present in our sample period.
4The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 introduces the data used
in the study, describes some of the stylized facts concerning currency denomination of international
bonds in our sample, and introduces the specication used in the parametric portion of the study.
Section 3 presents our empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical approach
2.1 Data and summary statistics
Our bond data are collected from Dealogic's DCM Analytics database. We construct a data set
of internationally placed bond deals between January 1, 1990 and January 15, 2010. We choose
this starting point for our sample period because less information is available on international bond
markets in this database prior to 1990. Note, however, that we use data available prior to 1990 to
dene whether an issuer is seasoned (i.e., has issued international bonds before). We include foreign,
Euromarket and global bond issues in our analysis. Focusing on our analysis of yen-denominated
international bonds, foreign bonds are those issued in the so-called \samurai" market, which is a
domestic Japanese bond market that allows only foreign issuers; Euro-yen bonds are issued outside
of Japan, most typically from London; and international bonds are simultaneously placed in both
markets and perhaps the Japanese domestic market.5
As summarized in Tables 1 and 2, our data sample includes 79,346 international bond issues
by 8,075 distinct rms.6 Note that nearly two-thirds of the issues are by nancial rms and only
one-third by non-nancial rms. We conduct our analysis on separate subsamples of nancial
and nonnancial rms as their issuance patterns and currency-denomination choices could dier
for various reasons, not the least of which is their willingness to engage in carry-trade related
5Please see Lopez and Spiegel (2009a) as well as Lopez and Spiegel (2009b) for further details on these yen-
denominated bond markets.
6Note that in 2,623 cases, a borrower issued several bonds simultaneously as separate tranches that dier according
to bond characteristics, such as maturity or collateralization. We chose to treat these tranches as separate observations
in our analysis. As a robustness check, we also collapsed an issue's tranches into a single bond observation by averaging
the tranche-specic variables, and we obtained qualitatively similar results. For indicator variables that diered across
tranches, we recoded the variable with a value of one if its mean was greater than or equal to 0.5 and zero otherwise.
These results are available from the authors on request.
5activities.
By issuer nationality, the full sample includes 3,140 issues (or 4% of the total) from 625
distinct Japanese borrowers; 15,967 issues (or 20%) from 1,609 U.S. borrowers; and 44,187 issues
(or 56%) from borrowers headquartered in the European Union. While Japanese issues and rms
are predominantly non-nancial, U.S. and especially European issuance is mainly by nancial rms
at 55% and 70% of national issuance, respectively. Financial rms from these countries issue
disproportionately more international bonds than non-nancial rms, as nancial rms only make
up 23% and 37% of the total number of national rms, respectively.
Currency denomination for the full data set is 16% yen, 33% U.S. dollar, and 17% euro, even
though the latter was only an available option after 1998. As yen issuance is the focus of our
analysis, it is interesting to note that 73% of issues by Japanese borrowers are denominated in yen.
In our analysis in Section 3, we examine yen issuance by non-Japanese borrowers to reduce this
home currency eect. Of the yen issuance, U.S. rms accounted for 13% of the bond issues, and
European rms accounted for 49%, of which 80% were nancial rms.
For our regression analysis, we use several issue-specic variables that have been shown to
be appropriate in other studies; for example, see Lopez and Spiegel (2009b) and the studies cited
therein. Table 3 contains summary statistics for these variables both for the sample with and with-
out Japanese borrowers. The variable Unseasoned, which takes a value of one if it is a rm's rst
time issuing in international bond markets since 1980 and zero otherwise, is used to examine whether
there are important dierences between new and established bond issuers. About 10% of the total
issues are by unseasoned borrowers, suggesting that rms that issue debt in the international bond
markets do so several times. Given our emphasis on the carry trade and yen-denominated bond
issuance, we also consider the distinction between seasoned, Japanese and foreign borrowers using
the variable (JPNIssuerUnseasoned), which is an interaction between the Unseasoned variable
and an indicator variable for issuing rms headquartered in Japan. While Japanese borrowers are
responsible for only 4% of total issuance, they make up only 1% of unseasoned issuers, which may
suggest that Japanese borrowers access the international bond market for yen funding regularly as
6a complement to their domestic bond funding.
Regarding issue characteristics, we examine the logged value of the deal (or issue) size in nom-
inal U.S. dollars, denoted as Log(DealV al). Both the mean and median deal value are just under
$100 million (or 18.4) with a relatively narrow interquartile range. The yield to maturity of the
issue, denoted Y TM, was found to be an important determinant of bond underwriter nationality
for yen-denominated bonds by Lopez and Spiegel (2009b), and we include it here in our analysis
of currency denomination choice for international bonds as well. The average YTM for the full
sample is 5.59%, which increased only slightly to 5.73% when the Japanese issuers are removed
from the sample. Bond maturity, expressed as the logged value of the years to maturity and de-
noted Log(Y rsToMat), averaged 5.75 years (or 1.75) for the full sample. Regarding the remaining
issue characteristics, 23% of the issues are callable, 93% are investment grade, and only 9% are
collateralized.
When we condition for Japanese trade in the second part of our analysis, we supplement our
bond data set with bilateral trade data from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (November
2009 CD-ROM) and with GDP data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators Online
database. Because we do not have rm level trade data, we focus on national merchandise trade
with Japan in a given year. We construct a measure of total trade, the sum of exports and imports,
that takes into account four dierent trade 
ows: (a) Japan's exports to country j; (b) Japan's
imports from country j; (c) country j's exports to Japan; (d) country j's imports from Japan. We
average 
ows (a) and (d) to get a measure of Japan's exports to country j, and we average 
ows
(b) and (c) to get a measure of Japan's imports from country j. The sum of the resulting two
measures is total trade.
We scale our total trade measure using nominal GDP from the World Development Indicators.
From 1990 to 2007, the average trade ratio is 5.6% over 104 countries. In 2008, the average trade
ratio over 59 countries is 4.0%. Because GDP data and trade data are not widely available for
2009, our data sample will not include bonds issued after 2008 when conditioning for trade. It is
also important to note that Japanese bond issues are naturally dropped from our trade sample, as
7Japan cannot have bilateral trade with itself.
Figure 1 presents the scatterplot of countries' average annual ratio of trade with Japan to
GDP over the period from 1990 through 2007 and the percentage of their rms' international bond
issuance that is yen-denominated. The relationship is relatively loose with a correlation coecient
of 0.07 and a slope coecient of 0.10. The correlation is low for two reasons: (1) many countries have
very few yen-denominated bond issues (i.e., points very close to the x-axis); (2) several countries
have little trade with Japan (i.e., points very close to the y-axis). The relationship in 2008, as
shown in Figure 2, is dierent in that yen-denominated bond issuance declined for many countries.
As a result, the correlation coecient increased to 0.31 and the slope coecient increased to 0.63.7
2.2 Econometric specication
We conduct our analysis using a logit specication concerning the determinants of currency de-
nomination in bond issuance with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Our baseline spec-
ication satises
I(Y enifjt = 1) = c + X0
ifjt




3 + "ijt (1)
where Y enifjt represents the currency denomination decision of bond issue i by rm f from country
j in year t. This variable takes value one for bond issues in yen and zero otherwise. Among
the dependent variables, Xifjt represent our issue-specic variables summarized in Table 3, Yj
represents dummies for the country of origin (i.e., issuers headquartered in Japan, the United
States, and the European Union), and Zt represents dierent time indicators. In particular, we use
a linear trend with a dummy equal to one subsequent to the advent of the euro area and a more

exible specication using individual year dummies.8.
7In Figure 2, Thailand is an outlier, as it only issued yen denominated bonds in our 2008 sample. After dropping
Thailand, we obtain a correlation coecient of 0.04 and a slope coecient of 0.02.
8Hale and Spiegel (2008) have shown that the advent of the euro led to a substantial movement towards issuing
in euro, albeit primarily at the expense of dollar issues.
83 Results
3.1 Full sample results
The full sample estimation results for our model of the probability of issuing an international
yen-denominated bond is shown in Table 4 for the specication with an annual time trend and
an indicator for the introduction of the euro in 1999. Unsurprisingly, Japanese rms are more
likely to issue in yen, while rms headquartered in the United States and the European Union are
less likely than average to do so. Overall, the sample suggests that unseasoned issuers are less
likely to issue in yen, but Japanese unseasoned issuers, especially non-nancial rms, appear more
likely to issue in yen as we consistently obtain a positive, albeit not always statistically signicant,
coecient estimate on the (JPNIssuerUnseasoned) variable. This latter result seems reasonable
as one would expect unseasoned non-nancial rms to be less adept at issuing foreign currency-
denominated debt and that Japanese unseasoned non-nancial rms would thus be more likely to
issue in yen.
We also obtain a negative and statistically signicant coecient estimate on Invgrade, sug-
gesting that issues from investment grade companies are less likely to be denominated in yen. An
interesting renement of this result is that the coecient on this variable for nancial rms is
insignicant for in column (2) and actually positive in column (5) with indicators for U.S. and
European rms. These results suggest that investment-grade, nancial rms are relatively more
likely to issue yen-denominated bonds than non-nancial rms. The reasons for this outcome are
not perfectly clear, but they may be related to carry-trade related activities. For example, these
investment-grade nancial rms may have been more adept at capitalizing on the carry trade
opportunities that prevailed over the course of the sample than their non-nancial counterparts.
Concerning the conditioning variables based on bond characteristics, we nd that increases in
deal values are negatively related to the probability of issuing in yen, as are increases in yields to
maturity. In terms of carry-trade related activities, this maturity result suggests that rms issuing
in yen tend to do so for shorter tenors. However, the direction of causality in this relationship
9is open to question. We also nd that callable and collateralized issues are more likely to be
denominated in yen.
The results for our time indicator variables provide two insights into the patterns of yen-
denominated international bond issuance. First, the linear trend is consistently and signicantly
negative, suggesting that all types of rms were relatively less likely to issue these bonds in recent
years. Second, after the introduction of the euro, nancial rms were relatively less likely to
issue these bonds and non-nancial rms were more likely to do so. The aggregate eect was not
statistically signicant as the sectoral eects are of roughly equal magnitude, but opposing signs.
These results suggest that the time trends related to yen-bond issuance are more nuanced
than this specication allows. The issuance statistics for the yen-denominated international bonds
reported in Lopez and Spiegel (2009a) also suggest that non-linear trends are evident in the data.
To address this specication concern, we introduce individual year dummies to capture these time
eects in a simple and 
exible way. These model estimates are reported in Table 5, while the yearly
coecients are graphed in Figure 3 and reported in Appendix Table A.1.
The estimation results for the other conditioning variables remain basically unchanged with the
introduction of this new time specication. The time coecients are generally trending downward,
as might be expected given the relatively poor performance of the Japanese economy over this
period, particularly the turbulence in Japanese nancial markets in the latter portion of the 1990s.
As the Japanese economy faltered, rms had less yen-denominated revenues to match against yen-
denominated liabilities. In essence, there was a decrease in the magnitude of fundamentals pushing
towards issuance in yen.
However, evidence of carry-trade like strategies appear to emerge in the middle portion of
the decade, as we see a substantial movement upwards relative to trend in the yearly coecients
from 2003 through 2007. This roughly corresponds to the period reported by Galati, Heath, and
McGuire (2007) as exhibiting activities that could be associated with the pursuit of carry trade
positions. As the entire decade was marked by very low Japanese interest rates, we would conclude
that this era in the middle of the decade represented the pursuit of carry trade like activity in
10international bond markets, as new issues were denominated in yen at an exceptional rate after
conditioning for bond characteristics.
3.2 Conditioning for trade with Japan
Table 6 repeats our empirical analysis but excludes Japanese rms from the sample in order to
concentrate on the nature of the relationship between trade activity and funding in the context of
the international bond markets. It can be seen that the removal of the Japanese-related issuers
reduces our sample moderately. To incorporate the trade data into our analysis, we add a new
variable, denoted as Trade=GDP, which measures the bilateral trade with Japan of the issuing
rm's home country as a share of its GDP. As discussed above, we view this variable as potentially
important indicator of rm fundamentals that may in
uence its currency denomination decision.
In particular, since rms that export to Japan have a revenue stream that is likely to be positively
correlated with yen movements, they might chose to access yen-denominated funding through the
international bond markets to align the currency denomination of their liabilities with those of their
revenue streams.
As shown in Table 6, the coecient estimates for the rm-specic and issue-specic variables
are qualitatively similar to the results in Table 4 that include the Japanese issuers. In addition,
the year coecient estimates presented in Figure 4 and Appendix Table A.2 are similar as well.
The key result for this analysis is the signicant coecient estimate for the Trade=GDP
variable for our three data samples. The coecients are positive and signicant when we do not
condition for where rms are headquartered; see columns (1) through (3). However, the sign changes
for the full and the nancial samples when we include indicators for rms headquartered in the
U.S. and Europe. Even for the non-nancial rms, while the coecient estimate is still positive,
the point estimate is less than halved and is no longer statistically signicant. The reasons for
this sign change are not fully clear, but it is most certainly tied to specic issues corresponding
to rm nationality. As in the previous section, the U.S. and European indicators have negative
and signicant coecients, suggesting that they are less likely to issue yen-denominated debt. A
11potential explanation is again that the home country currencies of these countries are attractive as
funding alternatives due to the large volumes of bond issuance in U.S. dollars and euro.
Regardless of the explanation, it also suggests that a relationship that has been found to be
prevalent in the literature, as in Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) and Nandy (2010), is not as strong in
explaining the probability of yen-denominated bond issuance, at least for the 16,502 issues in our
sample originating from countries other than Japan, Europe, and the United States. The relative
weakness we nd in this relationship may be attributable to the carry-trade incentive faced by rms
in the latter portion of our sample, where low Japanese interest rates gave even rms with little
Japanese export activity an incentive to fund issues in yen.9
Figure 4 presents the coecients on the year dummies and provides evidence that carry-trade
associated incentives may have driven the movement towards issuance in yen, particularly for
nancial rms, during the latter portion of our sample. In particular, there is a notable uptick
in the probability of yen issuance for nancial rms in 2004, the period most associated with the
beginning of attractive yen carry-trade opportunities when one considers both the interest rate
dierentials and the riskiness of market conditions. The response by non-nancial rms appears
later, turning up after 2006. Again, this result is intuitive, as we would expect that non-nancial
rms would be less likely to consider interest dierentials in most currency denomination decisions,
unless the incentives associated with such positions were extremely strong.
3.3 Breakdown of the Carry Trade
With the onset of the global nancial crisis in 2007, investors began rapidly unwinding their carry-
trade positions and reducing their reliance on yen funding. As funding in carry-trade positions led
to a depreciation in the value of the yen, we would expect the unwinding of such positions to reverse
this eect. Indeed, Figure 5 shows that the Japanese yen bottomed on June 22, 2007, and then
began a long period of appreciation. In 2008, the yen nominal eective exchange rate appreciated
by 32.4 percent, its largest move since the breakdown of Breton Woods in 1971 [Robinson (2009)].
9Of course, the carry-trade opportunities also gave those rms that did export to Japan an even greater incentive
to fund issues in yen, but our empirical specication does not seem capable of detecting that eect.
12With the removal of carry trade-incentives that may have been distorting the funding de-
cisions of bond issuers, we would expect to see a resurgence in the relationship between funda-
mentals and currency denomination decisions. As such, we next introduce an interacted variable,
(Trade=GDP)  I(date  6=22=07), which takes the values of the Trade=GDP variable for issues
after this date and zero otherwise.10 There are 7,944 observations in our full sample that satisfy this
criterion. This interacted variable is meant to measure the impact that the breakdown of the carry
trade had on the importance of economic fundamentals in the currency denomination decision.
The logit regression results including this variable are shown in Table 7; the year coecient
estimates are reported in Table A.3. The coecient estimates for the rm- and issue-specic
variables are qualitatively unchanged relative to the results in Table 6. For the specications
without the USIssuer and EUIssuer indicator variables included, the Trade=GDP coecients
are similar, but a little smaller, than those reported in Table 6. When the nationality indicators
are included, these estimated coecients appear to be slightly large in absolute value for the full
and nancial sub-samples, but slightly smaller and still insignicant for the sample of non-nancial
rms.
Of more interest to us are the coecient estimates on the interacted variable. These estimates
are universally positive and signicant. For the period after June 2007, the aggregate coecients in
the specications without the nationality indicators are now much larger, suggesting that issuance
of yen-denominated international bonds during this period was much more closely related to trade
activity than before that date. The aggregate coecients for the specications with the nationality
indicators net to a positive and clearly signicant coecient for the full sample, a small positive and
probably signicant coecient for the nancial rm sample, and positive but insignicant coecient
for the non-nancial rm sample. These latter results also suggest that there was a resurgence in
the role of fundamentals in the currency of issue decision subsequent to the breakdown of the carry
trade in 2007. In summary, this renement of the trade proxy variable indicates that the sharp
reduction in the carry trade subsequent to the start of the global nancial crisis in 2007 allowed
10It can be seen that there is also a local maximum at the later date of 8/15/2008. As a robustness check, we
also examined a variable interacting Trade/GDP and this later date. These results were essentially the same and are
available from the authors upon request.
13the fundamental economic drivers of currency denomination decisions to become more relevant,
especially for rms not headquartered in the U.S. or Europe.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examine micro evidence on the role of the carry trade in in
uencing issuers'
individual currency of issue decisions. We nd that during the period that many associate with
carry trade opportunities, the role of trade patterns in in
uencing debt currency denomination
decisions, something that had been identied in the previous literature as being in
uential, was
muted. This suggests that issuers deviated from fundamental concerns during the middle portion of
the previous decade to take advantage of the apparent prot opportunities aorded by the pursuit
of carry trades. However, an interactive term that measures the in
uence of trade patterns after
the peak of the carry trade indicates that the in
uence of trade patterns was over ten times larger
after the breakdown of the carry trade than it was during the heavy carry trade period. Once
these exceptional yen carry trade opportunities were no longer available, primarily due to increased
market volatility associated with the onset of the global nancial crisis, we observe a resurgence in
the role of economic fundamentals in bond currency denomination.
Our results therefore provide mixed support for the literature that claims that economic fun-
damentals in
uence currency denomination decisions in international debt issues. On one hand, we
do identify a period where the in
uence of trade patterns appears to work in the proper direction.
After the onset of the global nancial crisis in the summer of 2007 discouraged international bond
issuers from funding in yen to pursue carry trade prots, we nd that rms that originate in coun-
tries that export more to Japan are more likely to issue yen-denominated debt. This is in keeping
with the notion that the issuance decisions of these rms are designed to align revenue and liability
streams, and thereby mitigate exchange rate risk exposure.
However, the role of trade was much less apparent prior to the breakdown of carry trade
opportunities. During this period, the coecient estimate on trade was one-tenth of its magnitude
subsequent to the breakdown of the carry trade, and entered either insignicantly or with the
14wrong sign after conditioning for rms originating in the United States and the European Union.
This suggests that the role of fundamentals was overcome during the carry trade period by the
motivation to capitalize on potential reduced funding costs associated with carry trade gains.
To the extent that bond issuers funded in yen to take advantage of carry trade opportunities,
international bond markets may provide an additional channel through which pursuit of carry trade
like strategies can exacerbate exchange rate volatility. These issuers were funding in yen during
the \carry trade period" identied in the paper, providing yet another force for yen depreciation
during this period, and then likely raising yen to cover their debt obligations when the carry trade
collapsed. To the extent that investors behaved in this manner, the pursuit of carry trade like
strategies in international bond markets is likely to act towards expanding exchange rate volatility
in the same manner as that of more standard carry trade activities.
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21Table 1: Tabulations of bond issues in our sample
Number of: Full Sample Financials Non-Financials
Issues 79,346 49,803 29,534
JPN issues 3,140 720 2,420
US issues 15,967 8,795 7,170
EU issues 44,187 31,184 13,002
Other issues 16,052 9,104 6,942
JPY denominated issues 12,364 7,742 4,622
USD denominated issues 26,377 16,170 10,205
EUR denominated issues 13,868 9,093 4,774
JPN issues in JPY 2,291 432 1,859
US issues in JPY 1,614 754 860
EU issues in JPY 6,019 4,806 1,213
Table 2: Tabulations of rms in our sample
Number of: Full Sample Financials Non-Financials
Firms 8,075 2,486 5,585
JPN rms 625 120 505
US rms 1,609 371 1,237
EU rms 3,237 1,193 2,043
Other rms 2,604 802 1,800
Firms placing JPY issues 1,341 587 754
Firms placing USD issues 4,521 1,406 3,114
Firms placing EUR issues 2,366 832 1,533
JPN rms placing JPY issues 371 70 301
US rms placing JPY issues 143 73 70
EU rms placing JPY issues 535 314 221
22Table 3: Summary Statistics
(a) Sample with Japanese issuers
Mean SD Median IQR
I(Yen=1) 0.16 0.36 0 0
Euro: I(year>=1999) 0.73 0.44 1 1
JPNIssuer 0.040 0.19 0 0
Unseasoned 0.11 0.31 0 0
JPNIssuerUnseasoned 0.0065 0.080 0 0
Log(Dealval) 18.2 1.87 18.3 2.71
YTM 5.59 4.63 5.27 3.38
Log(YrsToMat) 1.75 0.86 1.61 1.20
Callable 0.27 0.44 0 1
Invgrade 0.93 0.26 1 0
Collateralized 0.085 0.28 0 0
USIssuer 0.20 0.40 0 0
EUIssuer 0.56 0.50 1 1
Observations 79346
(b) Sample with trade, excluding Japanese issuers
Mean SD Median IQR
I(Yen=1) 0.14 0.35 0 0
Trade/GDP 2.11 2.81 1.51 1.12
Trade/GDPI(date22Jul2007) 0.23 1.05 0 0
Unseasoned 0.10 0.30 0 0
Log(Dealval) 18.2 1.85 18.3 2.71
YTM 5.73 4.76 5.36 3.15
Log(YrsToMat) 1.77 0.88 1.64 1.20
Callable 0.27 0.45 0 1
Invgrade 0.93 0.26 1 0
Collateralized 0.082 0.27 0 0
USIssuer 0.21 0.41 0 0
EUIssuer 0.58 0.49 1 1
Observations 67226
23Table 4: All bond issuers, with time trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Fin NonFin Full Fin NonFin
Year -0.29 -0.25 -0.35 -0.29 -0.26 -0.35
(0.0068) (0.0081) (0.013) (0.0069) (0.0083) (0.013)
Euro: I(year>=1999) -0.088 -0.30 0.33 -0.082 -0.32 0.35
(0.058) (0.071) (0.11) (0.058) (0.072) (0.11)
JPNIssuer 1.93 1.64 1.76 1.37 0.99 1.35
(0.061) (0.11) (0.086) (0.068) (0.12) (0.10)
Unseasoned -0.63 -0.48 -0.97 -0.74 -0.56 -1.00
(0.080) (0.15) (0.11) (0.079) (0.14) (0.10)
JPNIssuerUnseasoned 0.29 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.55 0.46
(0.15) (0.38) (0.19) (0.15) (0.38) (0.19)
Log(Dealval) -0.43 -0.42 -0.49 -0.44 -0.42 -0.49
(0.0091) (0.011) (0.018) (0.0093) (0.012) (0.018)
YTM -0.95 -0.91 -1.05 -0.96 -0.92 -1.06
(0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021)
Log(YrsToMat) 1.10 1.27 0.69 1.13 1.31 0.72
(0.024) (0.032) (0.039) (0.025) (0.033) (0.040)
Callable 0.81 0.72 1.10 0.80 0.71 1.04
(0.032) (0.035) (0.072) (0.032) (0.036) (0.071)
Invgrade -0.78 -0.025 -1.57 -0.43 0.29 -1.30
(0.070) (0.11) (0.11) (0.068) (0.11) (0.11)
Collateralized -1.10 -1.44 -0.63 -1.04 -1.31 -0.73
(0.077) (0.12) (0.12) (0.079) (0.12) (0.12)
USIssuer -0.45 -0.61 -0.13
(0.047) (0.064) (0.082)
EUIssuer -0.78 -0.82 -0.73
(0.039) (0.048) (0.077)
Constant 584.4 515.1 702.5 595.7 530.2 708.4
(13.7) (16.3) (25.3) (13.8) (16.6) (25.4)
Observations 79346 49803 29534 79346 49803 29534
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.50 0.62 0.54 0.51 0.62
Dependent variable: I(Yen = 1)
Logit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
24Table 5: All bond issuers, with year dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Fin NonFin Full Fin NonFin
JPNIssuer 1.85 1.67 1.65 1.22 0.91 1.18
(0.065) (0.12) (0.092) (0.072) (0.13) (0.11)
Unseasoned -0.69 -0.57 -0.98 -0.81 -0.67 -1.02
(0.090) (0.15) (0.12) (0.090) (0.15) (0.12)
JPNIssuerUnseasoned 0.21 0.17 0.36 0.30 0.25 0.42
(0.16) (0.41) (0.19) (0.16) (0.42) (0.19)
Log(Dealval) -0.43 -0.41 -0.49 -0.44 -0.41 -0.49
(0.0094) (0.011) (0.019) (0.0096) (0.012) (0.019)
YTM -1.05 -1.02 -1.12 -1.06 -1.04 -1.14
(0.020) (0.027) (0.024) (0.020) (0.028) (0.024)
Log(YrsToMat) 1.16 1.38 0.71 1.19 1.42 0.74
(0.026) (0.035) (0.041) (0.027) (0.036) (0.042)
Callable 1.02 0.95 1.22 1.02 0.95 1.16
(0.036) (0.040) (0.081) (0.037) (0.042) (0.081)
Invgrade -0.86 -0.093 -1.65 -0.49 0.22 -1.36
(0.075) (0.12) (0.12) (0.073) (0.12) (0.12)
Collateralized -1.14 -1.44 -0.65 -1.07 -1.30 -0.73
(0.087) (0.12) (0.13) (0.089) (0.13) (0.14)
USIssuer -0.60 -0.83 -0.18
(0.050) (0.070) (0.086)
EUIssuer -0.86 -0.94 -0.76
(0.041) (0.050) (0.079)
Constant 13.8 12.8 16.2 14.3 13.3 16.5
(0.24) (0.32) (0.42) (0.25) (0.32) (0.43)
Observations 79346 49803 29446 79346 49803 29446
Pseudo R2 0.56 0.54 0.64 0.57 0.55 0.64
Dependent variable: I(Yen = 1)
Logit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
See Table A.1 for year dummy coecients. Omitted year dummy is 1990
25Table 6: Non-Japanese issuers, with year dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Fin NonFin Full Fin NonFin
Trade/GDP 0.039 0.058 0.020 -0.017 -0.061 0.0071
(0.0061) (0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.014) (0.0095)
Unseasoned -0.96 -0.68 -1.05 -0.99 -0.68 -1.01
(0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (0.10) (0.16) (0.14)
Log(Dealval) -0.45 -0.42 -0.54 -0.46 -0.41 -0.54
(0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.022)
YTM -1.04 -1.03 -1.12 -1.05 -1.05 -1.13
(0.018) (0.023) (0.026) (0.018) (0.023) (0.027)
Log(YrsToMat) 1.22 1.45 0.74 1.23 1.46 0.76
(0.027) (0.034) (0.047) (0.027) (0.035) (0.047)
Callable 1.11 1.04 1.48 1.11 1.04 1.40
(0.037) (0.042) (0.092) (0.038) (0.043) (0.092)
Invgrade -0.87 -0.20 -1.57 -0.66 -0.19 -1.54
(0.091) (0.14) (0.13) (0.086) (0.13) (0.13)
Collateralized -1.59 -1.30 -1.80 -1.52 -1.19 -1.93
(0.12) (0.13) (0.23) (0.12) (0.13) (0.23)
USIssuer -0.53 -0.99 0.24
(0.056) (0.081) (0.098)
EUIssuer -0.83 -1.15 -0.38
(0.048) (0.064) (0.094)
Constant 14.5 13.3 17.4 15.3 14.5 17.6
(0.26) (0.32) (0.50) (0.27) (0.33) (0.51)
Observations 67226 43692 23527 67226 43692 23527
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.53 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.58
Dependent variable: I(Yen = 1)
Logit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
See Table A.2 for year dummy coecients. Omitted year dummy is 1990
26Table 7: Non-Japanese issuers, Add iteraction term with year dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Fin NonFin Full Fin NonFin
Trade/GDP 0.033 0.048 0.018 -0.023 -0.074 0.0053
(0.0066) (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.015) (0.010)
Trade/GDPI(date22Jun2007) 0.047 0.073 0.017 0.046 0.077 0.017
(0.017) (0.028) (0.023) (0.019) (0.029) (0.024)
Unseasoned -0.95 -0.67 -1.05 -0.98 -0.67 -1.01
(0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (0.10) (0.16) (0.14)
Log(Dealval) -0.45 -0.42 -0.54 -0.46 -0.41 -0.54
(0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.022)
YTM -1.04 -1.03 -1.12 -1.06 -1.05 -1.13
(0.018) (0.023) (0.026) (0.018) (0.023) (0.027)
Log(YrsToMat) 1.22 1.45 0.74 1.23 1.46 0.76
(0.027) (0.034) (0.047) (0.027) (0.035) (0.047)
Callable 1.11 1.04 1.48 1.11 1.04 1.40
(0.037) (0.042) (0.092) (0.038) (0.043) (0.092)
Invgrade -0.89 -0.23 -1.58 -0.67 -0.21 -1.55
(0.091) (0.14) (0.13) (0.086) (0.13) (0.14)
Collateralized -1.59 -1.30 -1.80 -1.52 -1.19 -1.93
(0.12) (0.13) (0.23) (0.12) (0.13) (0.23)
USIssuer -0.52 -0.99 0.24
(0.056) (0.081) (0.098)
EUIssuer -0.83 -1.16 -0.38
(0.048) (0.065) (0.094)
Constant 14.5 13.4 17.5 15.3 14.5 17.7
(0.26) (0.32) (0.50) (0.27) (0.33) (0.51)
Observations 67226 43692 23527 67226 43692 23527
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.53 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.58
Dependent variable: I(Yen = 1)
Logit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
See Table A.3 for year dummy coecients. Omitted year dummy is 1990
27Appendix A
Table A.1: Year dummies for Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Fin NonFin Full Fin NonFin
I(year=1991) -1.18 -2.15 -0.17 -1.21 -2.21 -0.19
(0.14) (0.23) (0.19) (0.14) (0.23) (0.19)
I(year=1992) -2.27 -4.22 -1.15 -2.33 -4.30 -1.18
(0.14) (0.38) (0.19) (0.14) (0.38) (0.19)
I(year=1993) -3.48 -4.69 -2.66 -3.56 -4.86 -2.69
(0.14) (0.26) (0.20) (0.15) (0.26) (0.20)
I(year=1994) -2.29 -2.85 -1.72 -2.33 -2.94 -1.75
(0.13) (0.16) (0.20) (0.13) (0.17) (0.20)
I(year=1995) -2.98 -3.66 -2.28 -3.02 -3.73 -2.33
(0.14) (0.18) (0.21) (0.14) (0.19) (0.21)
I(year=1996) -2.95 -3.73 -2.05 -3.03 -3.84 -2.14
(0.14) (0.19) (0.21) (0.15) (0.19) (0.22)
I(year=1997) -3.97 -4.50 -3.56 -4.06 -4.62 -3.67
(0.15) (0.20) (0.23) (0.15) (0.20) (0.23)
I(year=1998) -5.19 -5.69 -4.80 -5.26 -5.79 -4.91
(0.17) (0.22) (0.26) (0.17) (0.22) (0.26)
I(year=1999) -4.66 -5.26 -4.13 -4.73 -5.37 -4.21
(0.15) (0.20) (0.22) (0.15) (0.21) (0.22)
I(year=2000) -3.89 -4.46 -3.37 -3.92 -4.52 -3.43
(0.14) (0.19) (0.21) (0.15) (0.19) (0.21)
I(year=2001) -5.09 -5.74 -4.11 -5.21 -5.90 -4.22
(0.14) (0.19) (0.21) (0.15) (0.19) (0.21)
I(year=2002) -5.36 -6.00 -4.57 -5.48 -6.19 -4.69
(0.15) (0.20) (0.21) (0.15) (0.20) (0.21)
I(year=2003) -6.28 -6.86 -5.60 -6.42 -7.09 -5.65
(0.16) (0.21) (0.22) (0.16) (0.21) (0.22)
I(year=2004) -6.55 -7.15 -5.65 -6.67 -7.36 -5.69
(0.15) (0.20) (0.22) (0.16) (0.21) (0.22)
I(year=2005) -6.63 -7.14 -6.22 -6.75 -7.36 -6.25
(0.16) (0.21) (0.24) (0.16) (0.21) (0.24)
I(year=2006) -6.40 -6.79 -6.45 -6.52 -7.00 -6.42
(0.16) (0.21) (0.27) (0.16) (0.21) (0.27)
I(year=2007) -5.74 -6.14 -5.75 -5.85 -6.31 -5.85
(0.15) (0.19) (0.26) (0.15) (0.20) (0.25)
I(year=2008) -6.08 -6.65 -5.36 -6.21 -6.84 -5.44
(0.16) (0.20) (0.24) (0.16) (0.21) (0.24)
I(year=2009) -7.61 -8.02 -7.11 -7.74 -8.23 -7.20
(0.17) (0.22) (0.28) (0.17) (0.22) (0.28)
I(year=2010) -8.39 -8.67 -8.56 -8.88
(0.65) (0.67) (0.64) (0.65)
Observations 79346 49803 29446 79346 49803 29446
Pseudo R2 0.56 0.54 0.64 0.57 0.55 0.64
Dependent variable: I(Yen = 1)
Logit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
28Table A.2: Year dummies for Table 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Fin NonFin Full Fin NonFin
I(year=1991) -1.76 -2.26 -0.90 -1.79 -2.27 -0.89
(0.18) (0.24) (0.30) (0.18) (0.23) (0.30)
I(year=1992) -2.89 -4.10 -1.67 -2.96 -4.17 -1.68
(0.20) (0.35) (0.28) (0.20) (0.34) (0.28)
I(year=1993) -3.99 -4.85 -3.10 -4.05 -4.95 -3.10
(0.16) (0.24) (0.26) (0.16) (0.24) (0.26)
I(year=1994) -2.64 -3.18 -1.88 -2.67 -3.22 -1.88
(0.13) (0.17) (0.24) (0.14) (0.17) (0.24)
I(year=1995) -3.34 -4.04 -2.35 -3.36 -4.05 -2.37
(0.14) (0.19) (0.25) (0.14) (0.19) (0.25)
I(year=1996) -3.29 -4.06 -2.15 -3.35 -4.12 -2.19
(0.15) (0.19) (0.25) (0.15) (0.19) (0.25)
I(year=1997) -4.45 -4.94 -3.84 -4.49 -5.00 -3.87
(0.15) (0.20) (0.27) (0.16) (0.20) (0.27)
I(year=1998) -5.71 -6.16 -5.27 -5.74 -6.19 -5.29
(0.17) (0.22) (0.33) (0.17) (0.22) (0.33)
I(year=1999) -5.35 -5.79 -4.97 -5.38 -5.83 -5.00
(0.15) (0.20) (0.27) (0.16) (0.20) (0.27)
I(year=2000) -4.45 -4.97 -3.85 -4.46 -4.97 -3.88
(0.14) (0.19) (0.25) (0.15) (0.19) (0.25)
I(year=2001) -5.67 -6.28 -4.61 -5.74 -6.38 -4.66
(0.14) (0.19) (0.25) (0.15) (0.19) (0.25)
I(year=2002) -5.94 -6.58 -5.03 -6.02 -6.71 -5.13
(0.15) (0.19) (0.25) (0.15) (0.19) (0.25)
I(year=2003) -6.90 -7.48 -6.12 -7.00 -7.66 -6.13
(0.15) (0.20) (0.26) (0.16) (0.20) (0.26)
I(year=2004) -7.16 -7.75 -6.04 -7.27 -7.94 -6.03
(0.15) (0.19) (0.26) (0.15) (0.20) (0.26)
I(year=2005) -7.22 -7.73 -6.72 -7.32 -7.91 -6.70
(0.15) (0.20) (0.28) (0.16) (0.20) (0.28)
I(year=2006) -6.98 -7.36 -6.93 -7.09 -7.56 -6.88
(0.16) (0.20) (0.34) (0.16) (0.20) (0.34)
I(year=2007) -6.27 -6.67 -6.02 -6.38 -6.83 -6.08
(0.15) (0.19) (0.29) (0.15) (0.19) (0.29)
I(year=2008) -6.65 -7.21 -5.70 -6.76 -7.36 -5.74
(0.16) (0.20) (0.27) (0.16) (0.20) (0.27)
Observations 67226 43692 23527 67226 43692 23527
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.53 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.58
Dependent variable: I(Yen = 1)
Logit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
29Table A.3: Year dummies for Table 7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Fin NonFin Full Fin NonFin
I(year=1991) -1.76 -2.26 -0.90 -1.79 -2.27 -0.89
(0.18) (0.24) (0.30) (0.18) (0.23) (0.30)
I(year=1992) -2.89 -4.10 -1.67 -2.96 -4.17 -1.68
(0.20) (0.35) (0.28) (0.20) (0.35) (0.28)
I(year=1993) -3.99 -4.84 -3.10 -4.05 -4.95 -3.10
(0.16) (0.24) (0.26) (0.16) (0.24) (0.26)
I(year=1994) -2.65 -3.18 -1.88 -2.67 -3.22 -1.88
(0.13) (0.17) (0.24) (0.14) (0.17) (0.24)
I(year=1995) -3.34 -4.04 -2.35 -3.36 -4.05 -2.37
(0.14) (0.19) (0.25) (0.14) (0.19) (0.25)
I(year=1996) -3.29 -4.06 -2.15 -3.35 -4.12 -2.19
(0.15) (0.19) (0.25) (0.15) (0.19) (0.25)
I(year=1997) -4.45 -4.95 -3.84 -4.49 -5.00 -3.87
(0.15) (0.20) (0.27) (0.16) (0.20) (0.27)
I(year=1998) -5.71 -6.17 -5.27 -5.75 -6.20 -5.30
(0.17) (0.22) (0.33) (0.17) (0.22) (0.33)
I(year=1999) -5.36 -5.80 -4.98 -5.39 -5.84 -5.01
(0.15) (0.20) (0.27) (0.16) (0.20) (0.27)
I(year=2000) -4.46 -4.97 -3.85 -4.47 -4.97 -3.89
(0.14) (0.19) (0.25) (0.15) (0.19) (0.25)
I(year=2001) -5.67 -6.28 -4.61 -5.74 -6.38 -4.66
(0.14) (0.19) (0.25) (0.15) (0.19) (0.25)
I(year=2002) -5.94 -6.58 -5.03 -6.03 -6.72 -5.13
(0.15) (0.19) (0.25) (0.15) (0.19) (0.25)
I(year=2003) -6.91 -7.49 -6.12 -7.01 -7.66 -6.13
(0.15) (0.20) (0.26) (0.16) (0.20) (0.26)
I(year=2004) -7.16 -7.76 -6.04 -7.27 -7.94 -6.03
(0.15) (0.19) (0.26) (0.15) (0.20) (0.26)
I(year=2005) -7.23 -7.74 -6.72 -7.33 -7.92 -6.71
(0.15) (0.20) (0.28) (0.16) (0.20) (0.28)
I(year=2006) -6.99 -7.37 -6.94 -7.10 -7.57 -6.88
(0.16) (0.20) (0.34) (0.16) (0.20) (0.34)
I(year=2007) -6.30 -6.73 -6.03 -6.41 -6.89 -6.10
(0.15) (0.19) (0.29) (0.15) (0.19) (0.29)
I(year=2008) -6.76 -7.38 -5.75 -6.87 -7.54 -5.79
(0.17) (0.21) (0.28) (0.17) (0.22) (0.29)
Observations 67226 43692 23527 67226 43692 23527
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.53 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.58
Dependent variable: I(Yen = 1)
Logit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
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